Although culture is very difficult to define, 1 we can say that tort rules, procedures and institutions both reflect and help determine the broad culture of the society of which they are a part. Concepts such as wrongdoing, causation, compensation and justice depend upon a cluster of popular beliefs and attitudes which are in turn  Cardiff Law School, Cardiff University, Museum Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3AX, Wales, UK 1 R Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society (2006) 83.
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moulded by the legal system. 2 To help with problems of definition, Nelken suggests:
"Legal culture, in its most general sense, is one way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes." 3 One aim of this article is to illustrate how the tort system reflects particular social institutions and practices.
But a more important theme is in conflict with this aim: we point to a dissonance between social attitudes and the reality of the tort system in practice. That is, we examine perceptions of tort derived from commonly held views about how the system of justice ought to operate and we contrast how tort, in practice, often does not correspond to these views.
This article is written in two parts. In the first part we consider images of tort deriving from traditional portrayals of justice. We set out seven commonly held views about the operation of the personal injury litigation system and then we contrast what actually happens in practice. We note the rhetoric and the social attitudes derived from long-held cultural views of how the legal system is supposed to operate and we then compare the reality. We start by reflecting upon the scope of tort principles. Next we consider who brings and defends personal injury cases and what role is played by courts and judges in their resolution. We then consider how the key principle of fault is interpreted in practice and how the operation of insurance affects traditional perceptions of how justice is delivered. Finally, we look at the reasons why damages
are awarded and what amounts are paid. Overall, we set out the seven commonly held views of tort and then, by examining the actual practice of personal injury, we undermine them.
In the second part of this article we look at another set of images which contrast with those set out in the first part. These images portray the tort system in a very critical way, depicting it as a burden that undermines rather than underpins society. It is widely perceived that tort has encouraged a damaging compensation culture. Our propensity to claim is said to have increased to such an extent that we can no longer 3 accept personal responsibility for our misfortunes. The system is thought to be awash with unmeritorious claims which have been prompted by an ambulance-chasing entourage offering to work on a "no-win no-fee" basis. Exaggeration and fraud are to the fore and non-existent or unmeritorious injuries are compensated. As in the first part of the article, although with less force, we then show how these images have become distorted from reality. In particular, the majority of injured people still do not go on to claim compensation despite being encouraged to do so through widespread "no-win no-fee" advertising. The exception arises in the context of road traffic accidents, where there is a strong culture of claiming. The significant increase in the number of personal injury claims over the last forty years is largely attributable to an increase of such claims. Whilst the extent of spurious and fraudulent claiming has generally been exaggerated, again, in the context of road traffic accidents complaints have more foundation. We examine why such a strong culture of claiming has developed in the context of road traffic accidents as compared with other types of claim. In conclusion, having shown how traditional and modern portrayals of tort differ from the reality, we show how tort in practice is heavily influenced by institutional arrangements.
The scope of this article is limited in so far as it examines only the role of tort in providing compensation for personal injury. Of course we are aware of the much wider scope that exists for tort claims. But if we were also to consider, for example, culture in relation to defamation and freedom of speech, or in relation to nuisance and the environment, we could not have constructed the present coherent framework for analysis. We are content with our present, more limited focus of study: after all personal injury litigation is by far the most significant area of tort for the everyday work of the legal profession in the UK and many other countries.
I. Tort and the traditional portrayal of justice

A. Tort law is universal and applies to all accidents and injuries
A powerful image of the traditional portrayal of justice is that of the universal application of the law to all citizens. All are equally subject to the law and all can equally benefit or be penalised by it. To law students this is reinforced early in their study of tort by the analysis given of the negligence formula. They are told that one of 5 surveys suggest that they are much less important than this. 8 More common accidents are those in the home, or suffered in the course of leisure activities or in playing sport, and yet very few of these result in any damages award. 9 It was estimated that there were 7.8 million accidents in the home in 1999 but in only 0.5% of these was there the potential for a successful tort claim. 10 Therefore, although work and transport injuries dominate the tort system, they are not representative of accidents in general.
All this means that the place where you are injured is crucial. Accidents in areas not covered by liability insurance are extremely unlikely to be compensated.
According to one study conducted over thirty years ago, whereas one in four road accident victims and one in ten work accident victims were compensated in tort, only one in 67 injured elsewhere did so. 11 Overall, only one accident victim in 16 who was incapacitated for three days or more was compensated by the tort system. However, if
we concern ourselves only with serious injuries, tort was much more important: where an accident caused incapacity for work for six months or more, almost a third of victims received tort damages. However, this increased significance of tort was then severely undermined: the importance of the tort system is reduced tenfold if account is taken of those suffering disablement not from accidents alone, but from all causes, including congenital illness and disease. 12 For a variety of reasons this group is much less able to claim in tort than accident victims, 13 and common law damages plays an even more limited role in their compensation. 
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The limited scope of tort compensation can be contrasted with the much wider ambit of the welfare state. Although only a small part of public expenditure upon welfare is paid to accident victims, 14 the amount greatly exceeds the total damages paid by the tort system. In reality tort is very much the "junior partner" of the social security system. 15 The Pearson Commission in 1978 found that seven times as many accident victims received social security payments as opposed to tort damages for their injuries and that the total benefit obtained by them was double the sum of all damages awarded.
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These figures must not be taken to imply that the tort and social security systems are mutually exclusive; in fact they are closely linked. The person who succeeds in his damages claim is more likely to be in receipt of a wider range of welfare benefits than the more typical accident victim who is unable to claim in tort. 17 The existence of the welfare state has provided injured people with the basic sustenance needed to undergo the sometimes lengthy process of pursuing a claim for damages at common law. If accident victims had not been able to obtain this immediate support from the benefit system it is unlikely that the action for common law damages -with all its delays, costs and complexity -would have survived long in the twentieth century. For that 14 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 1 § 87 roughly estimated that in 1978 only about 6% of public expenditure upon welfare was directed towards accident victims. This represented about 2% of total public expenditure at that time (welfare provision then being a third of the total). The calculation took into account the cash benefits and costs of administration of the social security system and added to it the costs of hospital and medical services. 15 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 1 § 1732. 16 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 1 table 4 suggested that in 1977 there were about 215,000 recipients of damages totalling £200 million whereas the social security system paid out about £420 million to one and a half million people. By 1988 although more people were receiving tort damages, the relative importance of the schemes remained about the same. 18 This is far from the image of tort as an independent "natural" system of rules of universal application supposedly forming the foundation of a just society. Tort in practice is limited in its scope, partial in its application and very dependent upon existing systems of welfare and insurance administration.
B. Tort claims for personal injury are often brought and defended by individuals
This image seems largely self-evident. Corporations cannot suffer personal injury, only individuals can, and although many of them will seek to attribute responsibility to their employer or the state or other complex body, the majority will name another individual as liable for their injury. Tort case names are replete with the surnames of individuals; organisations appear much less frequently. This individualism is said to be one of the most distinctive features of tort. When combined with a subjective approach in the assessment of loss and claimant need, this individualism is said to make tort distinct from the provision for injury made by the welfare state. However, this image of tort again needs to be qualified considerably when viewed from the perspective of practice.
Defendants
Let us first consider those who are the real defendants in the great majority of cases: the insurers. They are the paymasters of the tort system and are responsible for 94% of tort compensation for personal injury. 19 Although not named in the law reports and therefore rarely mentioned in tort textbooks, they are the "elephant in the living 
Claimants
When we consider claimants, it cannot be contested that the individual named in the lawsuit is the person who has suffered injury. However, bringing a tort action is also very much influenced by the insurance background to the claim. Here we concentrate upon claimants" abilities to appoint their own legal representation in order to bring the claim. We know that most tort defendants are liability insurance policyholders and have no choice in the law firm appointed to defend them; if they wish to take advantage of the indemnity provided by the policy they must accept the representation provided. It might be thought that claimants, in contrast, have complete freedom to choose their own lawyer. However, this is far from the case. 
C. Tort claims are determined in court by judges aided by lawyers and juries
An enduring image of tort law contained in popular views of justice is that of a bewigged judge, aided by similarly adorned barristers, carefully sifting the evidence to come to a just decision. The judge and barristers are invariably male with the latter distinguished by the finery of their robes. They sit in the formal surroundings of a courtroom, often wood-panelled, which affects in many ways the justice that is delivered. 33 Behind the barristers sit a phalanx of sober suited solicitors. Some people may also conjure up a box of twelve people good and true to form a jury by which their peers are to be judged. The formality is at once respected and feared. Although helping to ensure impartial adjudication untainted by emotional response, the atmosphere is so alien to many claimants that they will do almost anything to avoid it.
Fear of having to appear in court and face cross-examination is a major reason for claimants being too ready to accept the very first offer of settlement that is put to them. This also explains why some claims are not even pursued at all. However, it is a fear with little foundation because cases today are never decided by a judge and jury in court. The involvement of these symbols of justice is very limited when we consider how tort cases are actually determined.
We have already seen that the great majority of cases are really defended by insurance companies. The high cost of litigation, when combined with the small size of claims, ensures that it is simply not economic to utilise the legal profession and its accoutrements in the way that the popular imagination conceives. In practice, it is insurers who decide whether a case merits the very exceptional treatment of being taken to a court hearing. A key statistic of the tort system reveals how unusual it is for 12 a court to become involved: 98% of cases are settled before they are even set down for trial, and, of the few that do receive a trial date, most are concluded before that formal hearing takes place. 34 In one survey only 5 out of the 762 "ordinary" cases went to trial. 35 In effect, insurers allow trial judges to determine only 1% of all the claims made. In these rare cases the judge receives no assistance from that other major symbol of popular justice: the jury. Although juries remain an important feature of personal injury litigation in the USA, they were abolished in the UK in all but very exceptional cases in 1934 having fallen into disuse many years before. A "Runaway
Jury" simply cannot happen in a personal injury case in the UK.
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If a case does reach court and is determined by a judge, the decision is unlikely to be challenged further. Few cases are appealed to a higher court. The result is that when the senior judiciary are called upon they are left to adjudicate upon a small fraction of what are, by then, very untypical cases indeed. Whether an appeal court is to be given an opportunity to examine a point of tort law may depend upon the insurer because, if it serves the insurer"s purpose for doubt to remain, the claimant can be paid in full and threatened with a costs award if the action is continued. 37 By their control of settlement tactics and which cases are taken to appeal, insurers have shaped 34 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 2 table 12.
35 P Pleasence, Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (1998) 12. Earlier, Harris et al (fn 9) had suggested that as many as 3% of cases might go to trial. However, even in cases involving very substantial awards of damages, where resort to formal proceedings is more likely, courts are unlikely to be involved. In a study of cases where £150,000 or more was paid by insurers in 1987 and 1988 only 10% of payments were the result of formal court orders. Even these orders mostly related to children or patients for whom court approval of their settlements is required by law so that they cannot be dealt with out of court. See P Cornes, Coping with Catastrophic Injury (1993) 20.
36 J Grisham, The Runaway Jury (1996). If we turn our attention to cases that are settled out of court, as opposed to formally adjudicated, we find that it is still insurers that determine the extent that lawyers and formal procedures become involved. Increasingly they are seeking to settle cases at an early stage without resorting to the issue of court documents. In one survey of major insurers it was estimated that, because of earlier settlement, the number of cases disposed of only after the issue of formal proceedings had declined by a third. 38 Of course it has always been the case that the great majority of claims are settled informally: over thirty years ago 86% of cases were being settled without formal proceedings in the form of a writ being issued. 39 Now even more cases are being settled at an early stage.
Insurers are avoiding not only judges, courts, and court procedures but also lawyers. Defence lawyers are being bypassed and more work is being done in-house by insurers. In addition, in an effort to increase specialisation and cut costs, insurers have tried to ensure that fewer law firms act for them. For example, in 2004, AXA insurance company announced that it had reduced by half the number of law firms defending its cases. Similarly, over a period of four years, the Zurich insurance company decimated the number of firms representing its policyholders in catastrophic cases: only four firms now defend such cases for this large insurer. Much of the work being done in personal injury law firms is now being carried out by unqualified or partly qualified paralegal personnel. It is feared that, as a result of proposed reforms, non-lawyers at claims management firms could be left in charge of even complex personal injury claims. 40 The image of tort law as being regularly administered by highly trained lawyers in a formal environment is thus very far from the reality.
D. Tort liability is largely dependent upon proof of fault and findings of law
38 Goriely/Moorhead/Abrams (fn 26) 159. 39 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 2 table 12. 40 Anon.,Case Conundrum? (2011) 161 NLJ 1569.
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The extent that popular culture requires fault to be established in order for liability to be found is uncertain. It is clear that wrongdoing has been the fundamental force which has justified the continued expansion of the law of tort. However, the notion of responsibility goes far beyond that of fault and this is reflected in the strict liability regimes found in the law of tort. These areas of non-fault liability are usually limited in their practical effect but have widespread popular support especially in the area involving injuries at work. For example, it has been shown that people commonly think that employers should pay for injuries caused to their workforce even in the absence of any fault on their part. 41 However, overall the fault principle plays a major role in determining the popular response as to whether compensation should be paid.
In the absence of fault, for example, property owners are rarely found liable. The fault principle has a great effect upon students of the law of tort because of the disproportionate emphasis it receives in tort textbooks. Common law negligence is the core element of tort teaching; strict liability, especially if deriving from statute, is a neglected area of study. As a result, the standard response to the inquiry "is compensation payable?" very often is "it depends whether fault can be proven."
However, the hold that fault maintains over the popular and student response towards compensation in tort is not reflected in the actual practice of law. Via liability insurance, tort in practice provides a structure for processing mass payments of small amounts of compensation. In processing these routine claims insurers decide which elements of damage they will accept or contest. The key fact here is that it is unusual for them to contest liability; one study revealed that insurers" files "contained remarkably little discussion of liability," finding it initially denied in only 20% of cases. 42 Most claims are of low value and not worth contesting and, as a result, insurers make at least some payment in the great majority of them. Only very rarely do they insist upon staging a gladiatorial contest to determine whether a particular defendant was in the wrong. Contrary to the impression gained from tort textbooks, claim. However, in practice, reference to the refined discussions of law which take place in the appellate courts rarely features in the everyday work of the personal injury practitioner. In road accident cases it has been shown that driving skills and common sense exercised within the scope of the "rules of the road" are of much more importance than any legal principle. To emphasise this further, we can say that it is the facts rather than the law that are much more likely to determine the case. 43 One barrister surveyed memorably commented that an excuse for not reading the papers for the case in detail in advance of a hearing was that the facts revealed in court would inevitably change:
You can only say how it looks on the evidence you have got at the initial stage, which is very rarely the picture that will emerge at the trial. There used to be a chap in these chambers whose motto was, "Never mind about the law, it will all be decided on the facts, and never mind the facts because that will all have changed by the time your client comes out of the witness box anyway." We have seen above that it is the facts found rather than the law in the books that are more important in determining the result of a claim. But how are those facts 43 H Genn, Hard Bargaining (1987) 73. 44 Ibid, 74.
16
found? The traditional image is of a rigorous, impartial, and detailed investigation into what happened. In a road accident we might imagine there will be a careful forensic examination of the scene by experts in determining the cause of injury. The effects of speed, weather, the road surface and layout, vehicle design and so on will be carefully weighed. Witness statements from many potential parties will be taken and police reports will be scrutinised. Thereafter this evidence will be subject to cross examination in court to assess its probative value, this being done according to the strict rules of evidence. At each juncture the parties will be able to question and test the views put forward and submit their alternative views within the limits of the rules of civil procedure, which aim at providing a fair hearing for all.
The reality is very far from this idealised image. Classic empirical studies reveal that, in practice, it is insurance bureaucracy that largely dictates what facts are accepted, how the litigation proceeds, and whether, when, and for how much, claims are settled. 45 Ross, in particular, found that the rules of tort were transformed when they came to be used in the system in three ways: firstly, they were simplified; secondly, they were made more liberal and thirdly, they were made more inequitable. 46 Let us explain each of these features in turn, and reflect upon how the facts in most cases are actually found.
In practice, the rule that fault must be proven is too uncertain to apply to the individual circumstances of particular accidents. The rule has to be simplified and the One effect of these pressures upon insurers to dispose of cases efficiently is that the system is very much more liberal than it may appear. Ross revealed that many more claims succeeded than the strict rules of tort − emphasising the need to prove fault − would allow. Often insurers pay something for claims which, if they were to be fully investigated, would be without legal foundation. As a result "wherever there is insurance there is … a closer approximation to the objectives of social insurance in fact than the doctrines of tort law would lead one to suppose." 50 However, Ross also found that this liberality is but part of a system which overall is weighted in favour of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often used to illustrate the general inequalities in the legal system involves a "one-shotter" 47 Ibid, 100. accident victim suing a "repeat player" insurer. 51 Delay, uncertainty, financial need and other pressures cause claimants to accept sums much lower than a judge would award. The eagerness of claimants and their solicitors to get something from the system is reflected in the fact that, in the past, in two out of every three cases they accepted the very first formal offer made to them by the "risk neutral" insurer. 52 Those claimants who can withstand the pressures of litigation do better than those who cannot, with the result that those from a higher social class or wealthier background are more likely to succeed. 53 Those who suffer most are the severely injured.
Although in the greatest need, they will find their high value claim scrutinised in detail and processed very differently from the average case which typically involves but a minor upset and little, if any, financial loss. Those seriously injured are much less likely to receive "full" compensation than those suffering minor injury. By contrast, the great majority of claimants quickly recover from their minor injury and, for a variety of reasons, are likely to emerge over-compensated for their economic loss.
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The overall result of the settlement system is that rough and ready justice is 
F. Tort focuses upon compensating financial loss and serious injuries
One image of tort is of a caring system that compensates those who are especially needy when they are suddenly struck down by misfortune. Following a serious injury, the claimant may become very short of money. He may be unable to work. Sooner or later any support from his employer will be withdrawn and he may lose his job.
Savings, if any, will run out and reliance only upon the meagre resources provided by the welfare state could prove difficult. He may be unable to support his family, the mortgage may not be paid and the home may then come under threat. The claimant"s loved ones indirectly may then be among the sufferers. In addition, the claimant"s injury may need continuing care. Certain medical equipment and rehabilitation treatment may not easily be obtained from the National Health Service and the cost of providing it privately can be very high. Without financial assistance, nursing support may be reduced to a minimum, recovery may be delayed, and pain increased. To relieve these financial concerns there is the tort system. One image of tort is thus that it is a system which provides direct financial support which is much needed by recipients of compensation who are seriously injured. Who could possibly question this basic humanitarian function of tort law and deny its efficacy?
Unfortunately the truth of the matter is again far removed from the picture that has just been painted. Firstly, it is not the case that damages in tort are predominately awarded to those who have been seriously injured and, secondly, financial loss comprises but a small part of the overall damages bill. Instead it is non-pecuniary loss that accounts for a disproportionate amount of damages. Pain and suffering and loss of amenity comprised two thirds of the total awarded thirty years ago, 55 and it has remained at about that level.
The extraordinary importance given to pain and suffering, as opposed to financial loss, reflects the fact that most awards are for minor injury and involve relatively small sums. The average payment is less than £5,000 56 which is approximately two 55 Pearson Commission (fn 6) vol 2 table 107. 56 The median figure was £2,500 in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and closed in 1996- In practice, therefore, the claimants in tort who suffer catastrophic effects as a result of their accident are very unusual. Instead nearly all suffer very minor injuries and soon make a full recovery. They are not left with any continuing ill effects. In most cases the accident does not even result in a claim for social security benefits. 59 It is these minor injury cases which account for the extraordinarily high costs of the system compared to the damages it pays out. 60 But the essential point to note here is that the image of the tort system as caring for the immediate financial needs of mostly severely injured people in society is far from the reality. estimated that the cost of the tort system consumed 50 − 70% of the total compensation awarded in personal injury cases.
G. Tort awards full compensation for losses suffered
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Although most injuries compensated by tort are minor a few are much more serious and account for a substantial amount of the damages paid. In 2002 insurers estimated that only 1% of all cases in the tort system resulted in a payment of £100,000 or more. However, these few cases were responsible for 32% of the total damages paid out by the system. 61 It is these serious injuries that are more likely to come to public attention partly because they are more likely to go to court and be reported in newspapers. These accounts in the press are often written so as to suggest that the damages award is akin to a very large pools win. They may even give rise to feelings of envy in the reader because of the amount of the "windfall". What is rarely explored is the suffering and loss of the victim and how his day-to-day life has dramatically changed. The newspapers only rarely couple the compensation paid with details of the problems faced by those who have suffered, for example, spinal injury or brain damage. Instead the impression that is often left is that these tragic victims are exceptionally well cared for by society and that many of them are among the growing number of new millionaires.
It is certainly true that the recipients of tort damages are much better treated than the majority of accident victims for the latter are left to rely upon their own resources as supplemented by the safety net of the welfare state. 62 However, it is misleading to suggest that victims of serious injury will have all their needs met by the tort system. Compensation has traditionally been awarded in the form of a lump sum and the experience of past decades has proven that, for those who need long term care and support, it will prove insufficient. There are many reasons for this.
One major factor for the erosion of the lump sum is that in its calculation too little allowance is made for of the effects of inflation. A discount rate is used to allow for the fact that the claimant will receive compensation earlier than he would have had he been able to work for the wages now lost. This rate has consistently been set too 
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low; it has never matched the true rate of return on investment that the claimant can actually achieve. 63 At present a claimant is expected to achieve a real rate of return above inflation and after taxation of 2.5%. With inflation at 3.5% and taxation costs at a further 1%, the claimant must obtain a return of 7% at a time when the bank rate is as low as 0.5%. It is inevitable that any lump sum awarded will be eroded much more quickly than the court presumed.
Nor have courts made enough allowance for the substantial increase in life expectancy that is now evident. In contrast, too much allowance has been made for the prospective potential earning capacity of the disabled person. Increased claiming is thought to represent a decline in stoicism and personal responsibility. As such, claimants are depicted not as the victims of wrongdoing but as "scroungers" 66 and "self-pitying milksops". 67 For some, this state of affairs is thought to stem from longer-term developments within tort law, namely the expansion of tortious liability and the dilution of the fault principle to which the British are culturally tied. 68 Concerns about the compensation culture are more frequently associated, however, with shorter-term developments within the tort system since the 1990s: the emergence of widespread claims advertising and direct marketing; the introduction of "no-win no-fee" agreements; and the practice of paying for the referral of claims.
In the 1970s, personal injury claims were handled by general practice solicitors who waited passively for clients" instructions. By the late 1990s, however, personal injury had become a specialist area of practice and lawyers were advertising for work. Seeing the potential in the market, claims management companies (CMCs) emerged.
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CMCs realised that they could make money by recruiting clients and selling them on to lawyers.They engaged in mass claims advertising on television, on the radio, in newspapers and on billboards. They also made direct approaches to people on the streets, in housing estates and outside schools. referral. Personal injury claims are now big business and lawyers commonly pay between £600 and £900 even for lower value claims.
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This growth in claims advertising, CMCs and payments for referrals was fuelled by the privatisation of funding for personal injury claims in 2000. Legal aid was largely abolished and the use of conditional fee agreements (CFAs) was expanded. 76 Under these agreements claimant lawyers could secure an increase in their fees in each case that they won. They could recover up to double their costs if they were successful but nothing at all if they lost. 77 Claimants themselves were encouraged to litigate under these "no-win no-fee" deals because the only financial risk to which they were exposed was liability for the defendant"s costs if the case was lost. Even though in most cases this risk was only remote, further protection was at hand: for a suitable premium, insurance could be arranged so as to relieve the claimant of any concern over funding his claim. Damages could thus be sought at no financial risk to the claimant. It is widely perceived that this gave claimants no reason not to "have a go".
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As such, tort is thought to have become a moral hazard. 78 In response to such concerns, sec 44 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 will make claimants liable to pay the uplift in fees out of their damages. They will still, however, be able to initiate a claim without incurring any expense.
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The unrestrained culture of claiming thought to have stemmed from these developments has led to widespread concerns that tort has become a burden which is undermining rather than underpinning society. Organisations, businesses, public bodies and individuals are said to have become increasingly risk averse for fear of being sued. The papers carry stories of teachers refusing to take children on school trips, councils felling trees and volunteering in decline. Mounting claims are also thought to have affected the availability and affordability of liability insurance. The compensation culture is said to be "plundering the UK economy" 79 and "cutting a swathe through public service budgets". 80 As such, in stark contrast to the traditional portrayal, the modern image of tort is very critical. In common with the traditional portrayal, however, we can point to a dissonance between perceptions of tort in culture and the reality in practice.
B. Trends in our propensity to claim personal injury compensation
Overview
Whilst historical data are in short supply, those which are available support the view that there has been a long-term increase in the number of personal injury claims. They 
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claims have increased annually since 2006 though it is misleading to talk about general trends in our propensity to claim as trends differ in accordance with the type of claim.
Clinical negligence
As can be seen from the table below, the number of clinical negligence claims has increased significantly since the Pearson Commission"s estimate in 1973. 
29
Public liability
The Pearson Commission did not estimate the number of public liability claims though; at most, they stood at 28,000. 
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Employers' liability (accident and disease)
Between 2000 
The dissonance between the modern image of tort and reality
A dissonance has arisen between the modern image of tort and reality in several respects. Firstly, whilst there has been a moderate long term increase in the number of clinical negligence, public liability and employers" liability claims, this increase has not been sustained in the employers" liability context. There were fewer employers" liability claims in 2010/2011 than in 1973. Secondly, the perception that claims advertising, "no-win no-fee" agreements and payments for referrals have led to increasing numbers of claims since the late 1990s is misplaced. In view of the number of accidents that could lead to claims, the culture of claiming in the UK is relatively weak in the clinical, employment and public context. Thirdly, the notion that we are more willing to claim for trivial injuries than in the past is unsupported by evidence.
As outlined above (section I.F), although it is true that the majority of claims involve minor injuries with a value of less than £5,000, this has long been the case. 92 Individuals name, blame and claim by perceiving, interpreting and reacting to circumstances and events in particular ways and a wide variety of factors will affect an individual"s response to injury. 99 Moreover, to move through this naming, blaming and claiming process, the injured must be able and willing to do so, which will not always be the case. Individuals may, therefore, name but not blame or blame but not claim. Levels of claiming depend, therefore, on the prevalence of external factors and conditions which affect our ability and willingness to transform injuries into claims. It also depends on our legal consciousness which shapes our perceptions of our ability to claim and informs our willingness to do so.
Research has demonstrated that, in the past, potential claimants were unable to claim because they were not aware they could do so or did not know how. 100 In addition, their willingness to claim was dampened by both concerns that claiming would be stressful, expensive and intimidating and by doubts about the utility of claiming. 101 of the possibility of claiming after an accident but also of how to claim. Advertising also seeks to increase our willingness to claim in several ways. Firstly, it may reduce concerns we have about claiming and seeking legal advice. The public are able to receive anonymous advice through phone lines, thereby removing the fear of dealing with lawyers face-to-face. Adverts convey the impression that claiming is quick, easy and stress-free by avoiding images of judges and court scenes. The claims process is portrayed as routine, depersonalised and administrative rather than adversarial in nature. In addition, using the "no-win no-fee" tagline, adverts seek to reassure the public that it will be both free and easy to obtain legal advice and representation.
Secondly, adverts seek to reinforce the utility of claiming. They give examples of compensation awarded for various injuries sustained in different contexts, thereby highlighting the financial worth of pursuing a claim. They also imply that claims are frequently successful. Finally, adverts seek to create a sense of entitlement and talk of "rights" to compensation.
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Nevertheless, claim rates remain low for most injuries. It is not clear from the limited data available whether claims advertising has not been effective in increasing our general ability and willingness to claim or whether it has been effective in encouraging us to seek legal advice but that levels of claiming are being restrained by lawyers on economic grounds. Whilst CFAs may remove the financial risk of claiming from claimants, they transfer that risk to the lawyer. Lawyers working on a "no-win no-fee" basis must have sufficient resources to invest in a claim until its conclusion and take the risk of not getting paid if the claim fails. There is some evidence of CFA lawyers screening out economically unattractive claims as a result, although our knowledge and understanding of CFA practice is limited. 
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The exception in relation to road traffic accidents
In stark contrast to other types of claim, there has been both a long-term and shortterm increase in the number of road traffic accident (RTA) claims involving personal injury. Arguably, those involved in an RTA may have a higher propensity to claim because the nature of the problem means they are more able and willing to move through the naming, blaming and claiming process than in other contexts. The identity of the defendant is usually clear and the cause of the accident and injury are easy to ascertain. In addition, because we are all familiar with driving, we are better able to assess whether negligence has occurred than in other contexts. Whilst we may be in a relationship with the driver at fault, any claim is less likely to damage that relationship than in the clinical or employment setting. Although the defendant in practice is an insurance company, the fact that the wrongdoer is an individual just like the claimant may make claiming less intimidating. Also, because we deal with car insurance ourselves, we are more familiar with the process if something goes wrong.
All of these factors may play a role and, as a result, it may be that widespread "no-win no-fee" advertising has been more effective in encouraging us to claim in this context.
However, the strong culture of claiming can also be attributed to the following three inter-related institutional factors. a) Those involved in an RTA are more likely to be contacted directly soon after the accident and encouraged to claim.
For most types of accident the claims market usually waits for potential claimants to contact them in response to their advertising. However, it is much more pro-active in relation to RTAs. Those involved are very likely to be contacted by a CMC and/or lawyer soon after the accident and encouraged to claim. This is because it is easier for the claims market to discover who has been involved in an RTA. Garages, breakdown companies and those involved in providing replacement vehicles sell on to CMCs the result is that a stronger "cultural link" has developed between RTAs, injury and compensation.
III. Conclusion
In this article we have outlined two sets of images of tort that are dominant in culture.
The first set reflects various aspects of the traditional portrayal of justice. In contrast, the second group of images is more recent and relates to the development of a compensation culture. We have shown, in different ways and to different degrees, how these portrayals differ from the reality of tort in practice. In explaining how tort operates we have revealed significant features of the culture of tort. We have shown that tort in practice is heavily influenced by institutional arrangements. In the first part of the article we highlighted the influence of both welfare and insurance; in the second part our focus was upon the influence of the "no-win no-fee" claims market which has developed in recent years. As a whole, the article shows how the operation of tort is heavily influenced by the commercial interests and economic demands of the institutions which surround it. In relation to the modern image, the commercial imperative of the claims market is well-known although it is much exaggerated outside the context of road traffic accidents. In relation to the traditional portrayal, however, the influence of insurance remains hidden and much under-estimated.
Whilst the media ignore reality in favour of entertaining but worrying "tort tales" of greedy claimants and ambulance-chasing lawyers, tort scholars continue to ignore reality in favour of theory and doctrine. They have done little to dispel the many myths. Cultural images of tort fail to reflect how the system of compensation for personal injury actually operates in practice.
